Probabilistic anomaly detection in distributed computer networks  by Burgess, Mark
Science of Computer Programming 60 (2006) 1–26
www.elsevier.com/locate/scico
Probabilistic anomaly detection in distributed
computer networks
Mark Burgess
Oslo University College, Cort Adelers gate 30, 0254 Oslo, Norway
Received 6 July 2004; received in revised form 3 April 2005; accepted 8 June 2005
Available online 27 July 2005
Abstract
Distributed host-based anomaly detection has not yet proven practical due to the excessive
computational overhead during training and detection. This paper considers an efficient algorithm
for detecting resource anomalies in event streams with either Poisson or long tailed arrival processes.
A form of distributed, lazy evaluation is presented, which uses a model for human–computer
interaction based on two-dimensional time and a geometrically declining memory to yield orders of
magnitude improvements in memory requirements. A three-tiered probabilistic method of classifying
anomalous behaviour is discussed. This leads to a computationally and memory economic means of
finding probable faults amongst the symptoms of network and system behaviour.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Computer anomaly detection is about discerning regular and irregular patterns of
behaviour, in the variables that characterize computer systems. The detection of anomalies
in computer systems has often been pursued as the unambiguous goal of searching for
potential breaches of security; it often goes hand in hand with Network Intrusion Detection,
in which content analyses of data are performed in real time with the aim of revealing
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suspicious activity [18,42,25,29,34]. However, this is only one application for anomaly
detection; computers can also be approached as self-regulating systems that respond to
changes in their environment in order to stabilize their own behaviour. In that case, anomaly
detection becomes an integral part of the system’s regulatory process. Previously, the cost
of performing such an analysis on every host has been prohibitive, but this paper will
suggest a way of overcoming this difficulty.
Anomaly detectors apply machine learning and analysis to see whether any long term
trends can be found in data. One such approach was suggested in the early 1990s and
has recently been revived [30,21]. Automated self-regulation in host management has
also been discussed in Refs. [7,9,8], as well as adaptive behaviour [51] and network
intrusion detection [46,29]. Other authors have likened such mechanisms to immune
systems, striking the analogy between computers and other collective systems in sociology
and biology [33,24,8].
The ultimate aim of anomaly detection systems is to have adaptive behaviour that
responds in ‘real time’, so that problematical events can be countered as quickly as
possible. However, normal behaviour can only be determined by learning about past events:
trends take time to learn and analyse. This paradox can only be resolved by modelling
future behaviour, on the basis of a statistical idealization of the past and an observation
of the present (like weather forecasting). Even then, a timely response requires a rapid
processing of observations. The computational burden of real-time anomaly detection can
be considerable. One would thus like to spread the burden as far as possible around the
network to minimize the load at any particular place.
This paper is motivated by two goals: to develop an efficient method of anomaly
detection that avoids bottlenecks, and implements ‘lazy evaluation’ to avoid unnecessary
computational burden; and to develop a language for expressing one’s policy about what
constitutes an anomalous occurrence, relative to what has already been learned about the
signal in the past. We shall make some progress towards both of these goals. The paper is
organized as follows:
(1) We begin with a brief summary of the idea of host-based anomaly detection, its aims
and motivations in relation to the future challenges of mobile and pervasive computing.
(2) Existing techniques for mapping out empirical data characteristics are summarized and
appropriate statistical measures for discussing normality are identified.
(3) The notion of policy is then introduced, to account for the arbitrary aspects of
data analysis, such as threshold values and the representation of corroborating
environmental information that is not represented in the learning abilities of the
nodes.
(4) On the basis of the known characteristics of host data, a pseudo-periodic
parametrization of time series is developed, which partitions the arrival process into
weekly units. Some comments are made about data distributions and the implications
for machine learning.
(5) A description of the limited span, unsupervised learning algorithm, with predictable
‘forgetting power’, is presented.
(6) Finally, a multi-stage classification of data is proposed, where a response is instigated
only if a probabilistic detector signals a probably significant event (lazy evaluation).
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2. Host-based observation of anomalies
In contemporary network design, traffic congestion is avoided by packet switching.
i.e. by isolating traffic to ‘parallel’ branches of a network spanning tree that is absolutely
necessary for delivering data to their destinations. Computers, or nodes, occupy points at
the leaves of these branches and therefore experience an individual (subjective) view of the
traffic.
Each computer in a network has a different experience of the environmental bath of
requests and replies that commit its resources. Because the concept of an anomaly is a
subjective one (what is unusual for one node is a common occurrence for another), one
might imagine that nowhere in the network is better equipped to reveal anomalies than the
nodes at which they finally arrive. That is the viewpoint we shall adopt here, justified by a
previous study of the same data as are discussed in this paper [4].
Traditionally, anomaly detection has been centralized to trunk limbs of a network, in
the belief that one can only see the big picture if one is in possession of as much of the
data as possible at a single place. Some approaches even attempt to combine the streams
at different observation points into a single stream [31]. There are two problems with this
strategy: it places the entire burden of analysis at a single location, and it does not gain
access to anomalies that occur on non-network variables (e.g. disk usage), since these are
never transmitted across the network.
The utility of centralized analysis cannot be completely dismissed, but it can be shown
to have a limited value [4], and its clear disadvantage is the bottlenecking of traffic that is
contrary to modern network design; placing the burden of computation at a single location,
meaning that additional computing facilities are required. Studies at Oslo University
College find that correlations between nodes are generally too noisy to be useful, unless
there is an obvious functional relationship between hosts by design. The conclusion is that
there is little to be gained by sharing resource data between hosts [4], since the only clear
results are already known in the logistic map of services for the network. Hence there is no
pressing need for centralization or serialization of traffic.
Another compelling reason for abandoning the idea of serialization of the data stream
is that computers will soon be ubiquitous and devices will be transmitting and receiving
data without any regard for a centralized authority, over unguided media. In such a world,
the strategy of trying to centralize anomaly detection, at a single gateway, is flawed. A
detection scheme in which each host node is responsible for itself and no others reflects
the true distributed governance of the network and embodies the move from monolithic
centralized control to the more ‘free market economy’ approach.
The present work is based on the idea of computer immunology [55,8], in which
one considers every computer to be an independent organism in a network ecology. The
cfengine project places the individual computer rather than the network centre stage, in the
belief that soon a majority of nodes will not be aligned with any centralized authority [7,8].
Serialization of traffic is abandoned and one combines the analysis of network variables
with the analysis of internal host variables, using the natural filtration of data by packet
switching.
Arriving events have to be classified and counted in order to identify their statistical
significance. They have internal attributes, such as names, addresses, values, with semantic
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interpretations. These internal attributes contain information that can be used to identify
what is meant by an anomaly, by placing events in a specific context and category. An
anomaly engine is therefore a ‘prism’ and ‘spectrometer’, or a decision tree that expands
an event arrival/renewal process [27] into a spectrum of distinct attributes. By looking at
these attributes, with policy criteria that are appropriate for each, and then reassembling
the information into a consistent picture, we perform something analogous to a ‘medical
scan’ of the incoming event, which allows us to determine its significance to the system.
All scientific observations are facilitated in the context of a model, and one must
therefore formulate such a model for classifying the observations as they arrive, in order
to derive their meaning. The separation of scales is a crucial aspect of any model [13];
the distinction between trend and event plays a special role for anomaly detection [12].
Measurements of time series autocorrelations show that significant variations are only
observed in trends over times of the order of greater than 20 min in human-driven
activity [15]. Since an anomaly response time can be up to 30 min in most systems,
whether they depend on humans or automation, there is no point in labelling data much
more extensively than this, even though many hundreds, even thousands, of individual
events can occur per minute. The trends which we must learn in the data do not change as
quickly as the microscopic details of the data stream and do not need to be sampled more
often than a typical rate of change.
The philosophy in this work thus diverges from the strategy of examining every event
exhaustively. A change-event only acquires importance if can be successfully decoupled
from a known trend. We thus use a compromise between autocorrelation of numerical event
scales and macroscopic level correlations, and split time into granules of five minutes. The
data collector measures signals for a whole granule before deciding how it should respond
to each coarse grained event.
One ends up with a decision based on the following spectrum of attributes:
• The significance of the arrival time (the granule label).
• The significance of the arrival rate (number per granule), relative to a trend (average
number per granule).
• The probable uncertainty of in the assumed trend (a specified number of standard
deviations above or below the average trend).
• Entropy content of the distribution of symbol content within granules (described below).
• The symbolic content of specific attributes themselves, collected over a granule.
The memory required to implement this characterization is quite small: it comprises the
space required to store each measurement granule, plus the space required to remember the
significant attributes within the measured granule, for a finite number of granule labels.
The remainder of the paper considers how to rationally optimally compare incoming
granule observations to a memory of what is statistically normal, using an economical
method.
3. Entropy: Symbolic uncertainty
Interpreting the meaning in a data stream is central to the problem of defining when an
event is an anomaly. ‘Anomalousness’ is a subjective judgement, made within the context
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of past experience, and can be codified into a ‘policy’ about what is sufficiently anomalous
to warrant a response. We can use numerical estimates of significance (statistics), but a
complete analysis must also take into account the symbolic attributes of the arrivals too.
In order to define a practical policy for what anomalies are, one must have a
straightforward classification of criteria. This is a challenge for the symbolic content, which
can comprise many different data types, but we can use a simple information theoretical
measure as a first approximation.
In random event processes we learn distributions of values for observations, which have
characteristic shapes, and hence characteristic uncertainties. A sharp distribution about a
given value means low uncertainty; a broad or flat distribution signifies a highly uncertain
value. In either case, one must take the uncertainty in data into account before drawing
conclusions about it. This means that one requires a measure of that uncertainty, in order
to acknowledge it and use it.
The simplest gauges of a distribution are its moments, of which the variance (second
moment) is the most well known. The square root of this (or standard deviation σ ) is a
simple scale of the uncertainty. However, except in the case of Gaussian distributed data,
there is no clear relationship between the uncertainty and σ . In digital distributions, i.e.
histograms with few classes, the standard deviation is inaccurate and clumsy.
A very convenient measure of uncertainty, for any type of data, is the Shannon en-
tropy [52,13,9]. In the theory of information, the Shannon entropy is a numerical charac-
terization of a value distribution pi = ni/∑i ni , based on frequency counts ni of types i :
S = −
C∑
i=1
pi log pi , (1)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ C runs over the distinguishable classes of observation, ni is the number of
events of type i and pi is the normalized ‘probability’ of measuring an event of type i in a
similar signal.
The value of the entropy embodies the learning that has occurred about the random
process and provides a convenient scalar measure for making policy about a random
process. The entropy has a minimum value of zero, when all the observations are in a
single class, and a maximum value of S = log∑i ni , when each class is occupied equally.
This provides an adaptive, relative scale that can be applied to any interval of observation.
Example 1. Consider the entropy of a particular attribute: the origin IP address of a
data stream: in a network data stream, packets come from different IP addresses. In
the following example, we see that traffic has arrived from five different IP addresses
(interpreted as different symbol classes), but predominantly from the first address. It forms
a sharply focused distribution, as cfengine identifies:
Frequency: 157.158.24.40 |****************************+ (47/53)
Frequency: 80.203.17.11 |* (1/53)
Frequency: 66.196.72.28 |* (1/53)
Frequency: 80.202.77.107 |** (2/53)
Frequency: 80.213.238.106 |** (2/53)
-
Scaled entropy of addresses = 12.7 %
(Entropy = 0 for single source, 100 for flatly distributed source)
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This is a low entropy distribution, because most of the symbols (in this case IP
addresses) are of a single type. The alphabet for this comparison is learned in situ, and
is the set of five Internet Protocol addresses listed above.
If we measure entropy as a percentage of the maximum attainable value, then it can
itself be classified into high, middle and low, using arbitrary thresholds. This may then be
used as a filter in policy description. If we need a more specific characterization, there is
always the standard deviation (the square root of the second moment of the distribution).
4. Lazy attribute extraction
‘False positives’ or ‘ghost anomalies’ are events where current algorithms find problems
that are bogus; they are the familiar lament of anomaly detection designers. The dilemma is
to know when an anomaly is ‘false’ and when an anomaly is uninteresting. However, false
and uninteresting are two rather different criteria. To call an anomaly false is to assume
that we have pre-decided a policy for what is truly an anomalous event and what is not.
To call an anomaly interesting is to suggest either that a feature of the data is not only
abnormal but highly unusual or that it is usual but not according to a recognizable pattern.
Unfortunately, both of these criteria are matters of opinion rather than absolute measuring
sticks. What is missing from most network anomaly detectors is an ability to express policy
decisions about what is desirable and undesirable information.
In the present work, it is assumed that false anomalies occur for two main reasons:
• Because one attempts to classify data inappropriately (without a model).
• Because the policy for distinguishing anomalies is overconstrained.
The latter is often a by-product of the security applications of anomaly detection: one is
easily duped into overt ‘cold war’ paranoia that leads to an arms race of sensitivity: the
desire to scrutinize every event.
Looking, as many have, to biological detection in the immune system [33,24,8] for
inspiration, one finds an excellent yet imperfect system that is cheap to operate. Cost is
important: an immune system that was so expensive that it has to kill us to keep us alive
would be of little use. A host must continue with its primary function while detecting and
responding to anomalies.
The biological immune system is a multi-tiered reactor with many levels of detection
and a short memory. Organisms tolerate small amounts of harmful material, but mobilize
countermeasures once they begin to do damage [38]. The key method by which the immune
system avoids responding to false positives is the use of co-stimulation. A confirmation
signal is required (like a dual key system) to set off an immune response. The system is
lazy, in that it need not look for the confirmation signal unless the probability of an anomaly
is already high.
For a computer detection scheme, we can use the same approach. First we look for
a probably anomaly by comparing observation to learned experience. If the event looks
probable, we can consider the evidence determined from a supporting semantic model.
This reduces the amount of processing involved in detecting anomalous behaviour to an
absolute minimum, by using ‘lazy evaluation’:
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(1) The system learns the normal state of activity on a host.
(2) New events are considered anomalous if reliable data can place them at some sufficient
number of standard deviations above the expected value at a given time of week.
(3) The meaning of ‘sufficient’ must be defined as a matter of policy, in a given context. It
is subjective.
(4) If an event is found anomalous, it is dissected through our ‘prism’ in terms of its
informational entropy and symbolic content.
The policy referred to here can be used to describe which anomalies are interesting, and
specify when to respond.
Definition 1 (Anomaly Identification Policy). An anomaly identification policy is a
specification of predicates and thresholds, for observable attributes in a stream of
observations, that is used to identify anomalies. It maps the set of observable attributes
into the Boolean set {True,False}.
The strategy used here is to base anomaly policy on what has been learned about
past behaviour. For this, we measure the significance of events relative to known trends
and variations, and then use the symbolic content of the events, if statistical anomalies
are found, to determine how we should respond to them. This breakdown is important,
because it emphasizes the need for a policy for describing the importance of events in a
local environment. A policy codifies information that is not available by direct observation
of the host state (information that would require evolutionary timescales to incorporate
in biological systems) and is therefore an important supplement to the regulatory
system.
Example 2. For example, suppose one observes anomalous amounts of World Wide Web
traffic often come from a single IP address source. Given no further information, one might
dismiss a lot of traffic from a single source as a scan by an Internet search engine. However,
search engines generally scan from a number of IP addresses in parallel. The IP address
entropy of a friendly search engine scan is relatively high. So one might not be worried
about high entropy, high traffic combinations.
By examining the IP addresses contributing to a granule, and trying to resolve them,
however, one sees that low entropy sources are sometimes associated with unregistered IP
addresses (those which are not in the Domain Name Service or DNS). Such addresses are
often highjacked or spoofed addresses and make one immediately suspicious of the source.
Hence one can use this information and now codify a policy of responding to low entropy
statistical anomalies from unregistered IP addresses. Policy is therefore a specification of
acceptable attributes, here: arrival rate, address entropy and address resolvability.
Fig. 1 shows an example of how one can easily split the example of a multifaceted
network event into separate attributes that can be evaluated. The incoming packet is
first examined to see whether it is an IP (Internet Protocol) packet. If so, it has an
address, a port number (except for ICMP) and a ‘layer 3’ encapsulation type (TCP, UDP
etc). The different kinds of events can be counted to learn their statistical significance
(we call these counting variables) and the remaining symbolic information (Internet
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Fig. 1. An example network prism that splits an incoming event into generic categories. The signal enters at the
left hand side and is classified as it passes to the right. This can be viewed as a reversed sequence of logic gates.
One ends up with six frequency variables of magnitude N that count arrivals and two symbolic values.
addresses and port numbers) can be stored temporarily while the current sample is being
analysed. A sample is a coarse grained ensemble of events, collected over a five minute
interval.
We now have two questions: how are data learned and how are events identified as
statistically significant?
5. Arrival–renewal processes and self-similarity
A question that has been raised in recent years is that of the type of arrival or renewal
process experienced by the end nodes in the network. This is often relevant for network
analyses in which one attempts to model anomalies by looking at inter-arrival times of
events, i.e. especially where one attempts to invoke memory of the recent past to track
persistent events like connections.
Traditionally, arrival processes have been assumed to be memoryless Poisson processes
and analyses have used time correlations [32,42,43] to gauge likelihood of anomaly, but
measurements of network traffic and indeed computer behaviour in general show that the
arrival processes of normal computer operations sometimes have long tails and exhibit
power law behaviour [36].
If a renewal process is stable, one has the chance of characterizing it with a time series
model. Two kinds of stable distributions are known for the inter-arrival times of renewal
processes: Poisson distributions and generalized stable Lévy processes [49] (power laws).
Aside from these, all other distributions are unstable under convolution [13].
Unfortunately, traffic volumes are rarely high enough to see stable distributions at
leaf nodes. This has consequences for the analysis the time series: statistical quantifiers
sometimes diverge or become ill-defined. In particular, correlations over absolute time have
little value.
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The two inter-arrival time distributions of interest are the Poisson and the power law:
N(t, n = 1) = (λt)1e−λt =
∞∑
m=0
(−1)−1(λt)m+1
m! (2)
N(t) = µ(t)−α. (3)
In general, both λ and µ can be functions of time, in the presence of trends. We shall make
use of this below.
We can roughly gauge the type of process by means of an approximate measure of its
degree of self-similarity, called the Hurst exponent H . This is a scaling exponent for the
time series over an range of average granule sizes. In other words, one assumes a general
scaling law for a time series observation q(t) made at time t :
s−H q(st) = q(t). (4)
One then applies this to locally averaged functions:
s−H 〈q(st)〉 = 〈q(t)〉, (5)
where 〈·〉 is defined in Eq. (11). The exponent H can be estimated for real data by noting
that, over an interval t ,
〈max(q(t))− min(q(t))〉st = s H 〈max(q(t))−min(q(t))〉t , (6)
i.e.,
H =
log
( 〈max−min〉st〈max−min〉t
)
log(s)
. (7)
The values above unity signify probable power laws, with bursty behaviour. The data used
in this paper fall into two main groupings. Some data for these are summarized in Table 1.
The results show a wide variety of behaviours in the signal, as measured over many months,
some of which would tend to indicate self-similar behaviour. One therefore expects to have
problems with the naive analysis of time correlations in these data. What is clear from
comparing the actual graphs of data with their Hurst exponents is that the type of arrival
process (characterized by H ) is in no way correlated with the ability to separate signal
from noise in this periodic parametrization discussed in this paper (characterized by small
error bars, e.g. in Fig. 3).
Another approach is required. In fact, we can avoid troubles associated with inter-arrival
time tails entirely, below, by means of a simple transformation that integrates long or short
inter-arrival time tails completely, by projecting them into a periodic time topology. This
will leave us with a completely normalizable framework, with no ambiguities.
It was shown in Ref. [10] that the transformation, to be described, may be used to
represent the data in arrival processes, even with noise. Indeed, it is implicit in the Fourier
theorem that any function projected into a periodic topology can be represented using a
spectral (count per interval) representation.
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Table 1
Approximate Hurst exponent ranges for different
variables show that the data exhibit a variety of scaling
behaviours once projected into a periodic framework.
Some show long tail indications while others have
only Gaussian jitter
q(τ ) H (q)
Users and processes 0.6 ± 0.07
Network connections (various) 1.0 − 2.1 ± 0.1
6. Two-dimensional cyclic time parametrization
The solution to the arrival time issue is to make time itself finite and cyclic, using what
is known about the processes in a computer system [16].
By making our model of time periodic we solve two problems: we are able replace the
idea of time correlation with a trend analysis based on counting, i.e. a traditional frequency
analysis, and we achieve a significant simplification of the machine-learning and analysis
algorithms.
The basic observation that makes resource anomaly detection simpler and more efficient
than traditional time series analysis [5] is that there is an inhomogeneous pattern to human
resource usage, and this is reflected in computer resource usage. This can be used to
remodel and simplify the data. It yields, in effect, a simple and automatic supervised
classification of the machine-learning process.
The approximate weekly periodicity observed in computer resources [16], allows one
to parametrize time in topological slices of period P = 1 week, using the relation
t = n P + τ, (8)
n = 0, 1, 2, . . .. In this parametrization, time assumes a cylindrical form, labelled by two
interleaved coordinates (τ, n), both of which are discrete in practice [11]. We then sum or
average over the n variable, leaving a single angular variable τ , after a renormalization of
the distribution.
This transformation is indisputably justified in any process that is periodic in time, by
Fourier theory; however, it may also be applied to functions that are only pseudo-periodic
or close to periodic on average. See Ref. [10] for a detailed discussion of this model. The
key observation is that the arrival processes have periodic inhomogeneities λ(τ) and µ(τ).
Applying this transformation to the problematical inter-arrival time distributions in
Eq. (3), we see that the Poisson law may be written in terms of a periodic, dimensionless
quantity τ/P , by making the substitution Eq. (8):
N(τ/P, n) =
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
n=1
(−1)m λ(τ)
m+n
n!m! (n P +τ)
n+m
∝ f (τ )
∞∑
α=−∞
ζα(τ/P) (9)
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Fig. 2. A weekly periodogram of some resource variable expectations. These values are scaled and smoothed,
measured by cfengine, and uncertainties have been suppressed. The lines represent the effective average
thresholds for normal behaviour. Note how each line has its own characteristic ‘shape’ or pattern of usage, which
the system learns by empirical measurement.
and the power law is simply
N(τ/P) = µ(τ)
∞∑
n=0
(n P +τ)−α ∝ f ′(τ )ζα(τ/P), (10)
where f, f ′ are unknown, but periodic functions. Both of these results are expressed in
terms of generalized forms known as zeta functions, multiplied by periodic amplitude
functions. In this form, the Poisson law is seen to be simply the generalization of the power
law, formed by superimposing many signals with different characteristic decay rates.
What is significant is that the resulting function of τ/P is well behaved for large times,
over the limited interval 0 ≤ τ ≤ P; indeed, the large n behaviour plays a less and less sig-
nificant role that can be normalized away in the sums. The short τ behaviour is still singular
for each power law component of positive α, but this is easily eliminated by coarse grain-
ing, which prevents δτ from ever being zero. These transformations are the standard tricks
of renormalization statistics [39] (see Section 8). To summarize, by restricting attention
to fixed-size granules δτ , taken one at a time, we can sum out and renormalize away the
effects of the arrival process, leaving a periodic trend and an unknown amount of scatter.
As one would expect from the Fourier theory, a superposition of many such signals will
lead to a strong trend if there are periodic variations in the data. Any other signals will
appear as fluctuations that will either appear as noise or as anomalies, depending on their
relative magnitude. In Fig. 4, on the other hand, there is no convincing periodicity to be
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Fig. 3. Measured time trace of NETBIOS name lookups, averaged over 19.4 weeks. This basic pattern has been
measured several times, starting with no data, and has remained stable for almost two years. It has a clear signal.
Uncertainties characterized by error bars represent the standard deviations σ〈〈P〉〉(tmodP).
Fig. 4. Measured time trace averaged over 19.4 weeks of ftp connections. Here there is no discernible signal in
the pattern of variations. The level of noise represented by the error bars is greater than the variation in the signal.
M. Burgess / Science of Computer Programming 60 (2006) 1–26 13
seen in the pattern of the data series, which begs the questions of whether this method of
insisting on periodicity is ‘appropriate’. However, the contention here is that this is not the
way to look at it. The empirical studies indicate that weekly periodicity is by far the most
important structural trend in human computer data [16]. If we can model the periodic parts
of a signal that are attributable to weekly behaviour, then it will be possible to extract those
parts and get them under control. Everything that is left, relative to this trend, is either noise
that can be renormalized away, or an anomaly that can be identified more easily. Empirical
studies provide compelling evidence for this.
We shall therefore assume that it is appropriate to project into periodic time, since the
lack of periodicity is simply caused by a lack of a human interaction and hence a lack of
signal, meaning no pattern of normalcy and nothing would be gained by allowing time to
extend indefinitely. In pedestrian terms, if we cannot separate significant variations from
noise, in this parametrization, we cannot distinguish anomalies either, in this model; thus
no harm is done by making the assumption.
The periodic parametrization of time means that one can average (over n) the values
at each point τ , leading to a mean and standard deviation of observations at each
corresponding time of the week. Both the mean and standard deviations are thus functions
of τ , and the latter plays the role of a scale for fluctuations at τ , which can be used
to grade their significance. The cylindrical parametrization also enables one to invoke a
compression algorithm on the data, so that one never needs to record more data points than
exist within a single period. It thus becomes a far less resource intensive proposition to
monitor system normalcy. This compression is not possible in a linear time series approach,
using splines etc. [30].
Test data are taken to be a number of universal and easily measurable characters (see
Fig. 2):
• Number of users.
• Numbers of processes.
• Unix ‘load averages’.
• Average utilization of the system (load average).
• Number of incoming/outgoing connections to a variety of well known services.
• Numerical characteristics of incoming and outgoing network packets.
These variables have been examined earlier and their behaviour is explained in [9,16].
Other variables might be studied in the future. A further advantage of this model is that the
learned average behaviour can be stored indefinitely by using a simple database format,
covering only a single working week in granules of five minutes, as we now show in the
next section.
7. Separation of scales
In a dynamical, stochastic system, there are two basic kinds of change: non-equilibrium
change (slow, progressive, trend variation that occurs on a timescale that is long compared
to measurement) and fluctuations (occurring on a timescale that is fast compared to
the measuring process). If the system is approximately stable, i.e. close to a steady
state, then the combination of these can be used to characterize the recent history of
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the system. Fluctuations can be measured as a time series and analysed [30] in order to
provide the necessary information, and averaged out into granules or sampling intervals.
During a sampling interval, data are collected, the mean and variance of the sample
are found and these values are stored for the labelled interval. The sampling interval
is chosen arbitrarily on the basis of the typical autocorrelation length of the data being
observed [16].
Time series data can consume a lot of space. However, a considerable compression
of the data can be achieved, and several orders of magnitude of computation time can
be spared by separating the weekly data trends from the arrival of random events and
by updating belief-estimates of only those trends, iteratively, rather than using an offline
analysis based on a complete journal of the past (see Section 11).
This can yield a good approximation to an appropriate sliding window, time series data
sample [16]. One obvious approach, for such a method, is to use a convergent geometric
series in order to define an average which degrades the importance of data over time: in
other words, a series which forgets old data at a predictable rate. After a certain interval, the
oldest memories in the data contribute only an insignificant fraction to the actual values.
8. Computing expectations with memory loss
Our aim, then, is to benefit from the fact that we do not have to store the entire history
of the system in order to infer its normal behaviour in the present. Rather, we can develop
a Markov-style model in which the system not only learns but also forgets at a predictable
rate.
Following the maintenance theorem of Ref. [12], we define the normal behaviour of a
system as its expected behaviour. The standard deviation of the data values is a convenient
scale with which to measure anomalies, and we now ignore the time-like nature of the
arrival process for events.
For a body of data, consisting of N data points {q1, . . . , qN }, one conventionally defines
averages and standard deviations as follows:
〈q〉 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
qi
〈q|Q〉 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
qi Qi
σ =
√√√√ 1
N
n∑
i=1
(qi − 〈q〉)2
=
√
〈q2〉 − 〈q〉2
= √〈δq|δq〉
=
√
〈δq2〉. (11)
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This notation will help us to see that alternative definitions, with tailor-made properties,
can unambiguously replace the expressions 〈·〉 for averages. The use of these measures as
characteristic scales in no way implies a model based on Gaussian distributions.
To update the memory of averages and variances, an algorithm is required, satisfying
the following properties:
• It should approximate an offline sliding window time series analysis that forgets old
data at a predictable rate [16].
• It should present a minimal load to the system concerned.
• It must have a predictable error or uncertainty margin.
These goals can be accomplished straightforwardly as follows. We replace the usual
expectation function with a new one with the desired properties, in such a way that derived
quantities bear the same functional relationships as with the usual definitions:
〈q〉 → 〈〈q〉〉 (12)
which gradually forgets old data in a controlled manner. Similarly, we replace the standard
deviation (or second moment of the data distribution) with
σ(〈q〉)→ σ(〈〈q〉〉), (13)
where
σ(〈〈q〉〉) ≡
√[〈〈q2〉〉N − 〈〈q〉〉2N ] =
√
〈〈δq2〉〉N . (14)
The new expectation function is defined iteratively, as follows:
Definition 2 (Iterative Expectation Function). Let q be an observation, and 〈〈qi 〉〉 be the
i th estimator of the average, with geometric fall-off; then 〈〈qi 〉〉 may be defined by the
recurrence relation
〈〈q〉〉i+1 = (q | 〈〈q〉〉i )
〈〈q〉〉0 = 0, (15)
where
(q1|q2) = w q1 +w q2
w +w . (16)
and w,w are constants.
Significantly, the number of data is now unspecified (we denote this by i → ∞) meaning
that this algorithm does not depend specifically on the arbitrary number of data samples
N . Instead it depends on the ratio w/w which is a forgetfulness parameter.
We note that, as new data points are measured after N samples, 〈q〉 changes only by
q/N while 〈〈q〉〉N changes by a fixed fraction wq/(w + w) that is independent of N .
Thus as the number of samples becomes large over time, the 〈·〉 measure ceases to learn
anything about the current state, as q/N → 0, but 〈〈·〉〉 continues to refresh its knowledge
of the recent past.
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The repeated iteration of the expression for the finite-memory average leads to a
geometric progression in the parameter λ = w/(w +w):
〈〈q〉〉N ≡ (q1|(q2| . . . (qr |(. . . |qN )))) = w
w +w q1 +
ww
(w +w)2 q2
+ · · · + ww
r−1
(w +w)r qr + · · ·
wn
(w +w)n qN . (17)
This has easily predictable properties. Thus, on each iteration, the importance of previous
contributions is degraded by λ. If we require a fixed window of size N iterations, then λ
can be chosen in such a way that, after N iterations, the initial estimate qN is so demoted
as to be insignificant, at the level of accuracy required. For instance, an order of magnitude
drop within N steps means that λ ∼ |10−N |.
The learning procedure proposed here is somewhat reminiscent of a Bayesian
probability flow [44,57], but it differs conceptually. A Bayesian algorithm assumes that
each new datum can tell us the truth or falsity of a number of hypotheses. In our case, we
have only single hypothesis: the normal state of the system, with a potentially unlimited
amount of input. We do not expect this procedure to converge towards a static ‘true’ value
as we might in a Bayesian hypothesis. Rather we want to implement a certain hysteresis in
the normality function.
We now need to store the following triplets in a fixed-size database:
{τ, 〈〈q〉〉(τ ), σ 2(〈〈q〉〉, τ )}. (18)
We also use the δ symbol to represent the current deviation from average of a pseudo-
periodic variable q(t):
δq(t) ≡ q(t)− 〈〈q〉〉t . (19)
To satisfy the requirements of a decaying window average, with determined sensitivity
α ∼ 1/N , we require:
(1) w
w+w ∼ α, or w ∼ w/N .
(2)
(
w
w+w
)N  1N , or wN  w.
Consider the ansatz w = 1 − r , w = r , and the accuracy α. We wish to solve
r N = α (20)
for N . With r = 0.6, α = 0.01, we have N = 5.5. Thus, if we consider the weekly update
over five weeks (a month), then the importance of month old data will have fallen to one
hundredth. This is a little too quick, since a month of fairly constant data is required to find
a stable average. Taking r = 0.7, α = 0.01 gives N = 13. On the basis of experience with
offline analysis and field testing, this is a reasonable arbitrary value to choose.
9. Pseudo-periodic expectation
The recent behaviour of a computer can be summarized by nth-order Markov processes,
during periods of change, and by hidden Markov models during steady state behaviour,
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but one still requires a parametrization for data points. Such models must be formulated
on a periodic background [10], owing to the importance of periodic behaviour of users.
The precise algorithm for averaging and local coarse graining is somewhat subtle, and
involves naturally orthogonal time dimensions which are extracted from the coding of the
database. This is discussed here using an ergodic principle: a bi-dimensional smoothing
is implemented, allowing twice the support normally possible for the average, given a
number of data points. This provides good security against “false positive” anomalies and
other noise.
Consider a pseudo-periodic function, with pseudo-period P ,
q(t) =
∞∑
n=0
q(n P + τ ) (0 ≤ τ < P)
≡
∞∑
n=0
χn(τ ). (21)
This defines a set of periodic functions χn(τ ) with periodic coordinate 0 ≤ τ < P . The
time coordinate τ lives on the circular dimension. In practice, it is measured in p discrete
time intervals τ = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τ − p}. In this decomposition, time is a two-dimensional
quantity. There are thus two kinds of average which can be computed: averages over
corresponding times in different periods (topological averages 〈χ(τ)〉T ) and averages of
neighbouring times in a single period (local averages 〈χ(τ)〉P ). For clarity, both traditional
averages and iterative averages will be defined explicitly. Using traditional formulae, one
defines the two types of mean value by
〈χ〉T (τ ) ≡ 1T
l+T∑
n=l
χn(τ )
〈χ〉P (n) ≡ 1P
τ+P∑
=τ
χn() (22)
where l and τ are arbitrary start values and P, T are integer intervals for the averages,
in the two time-like directions. Within each interval that defines an average, there is a
corresponding definition of the variation and standard deviation, at a point τ :
σT (τ ) ≡
√√√√ 1
T
n=l+T∑
n=l
(χn(τ )− 〈χ〉T (τ ))2 =
√〈δχT |δχT 〉T
σP (n) ≡
√√√√ 1
P
=τ+P∑
=τ
(χn()− 〈χ〉P ())2 =
√〈δχP |δχP〉P . (23)
Limited memory versions of these may also be defined, straightforwardly, from the
preceding section by replacing 〈δq|δq〉 with 〈〈δq2〉〉 from Eq. (15):
〈χ〉P → 〈〈χ〉〉P
〈χ〉T → 〈〈χ〉〉T . (24)
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Similarly, the deviations are given by
σ〈〈T 〉〉(τ ) ≡
√
〈〈(δ〈〈T 〉〉χ)2〉〉T
σ〈〈P〉〉(n) ≡
√
〈〈(δ〈〈P〉〉χ)2〉〉P (25)
where, for any measure X , we have defined
(δ〈〈P〉〉X) ≡ X − 〈〈X〉〉P (26)
(δ〈〈T 〉〉X) ≡ X − 〈〈X〉〉T . (27)
Here one simply replaces the evenly weighted sum over the entire history with an iteratively
weighted sum that falls off with geometric degradation.
A major advantage of this formulation is that one only needs to retain and update two
values per variable, the mean and the variance, in order to obtain all the information, not
2N data, for history size N .
10. Cross-check calibration: Annealing potential anomalies
We now have a stable characterization of the time series that makes optimum use of the
known structure of the data. In a two-dimensional time series, one has two independent
vectors for change that must be considered in generating a normal surface potential for
comparison.
So far, the discussion has focused on a single periodicity in the time series data; however
we must also acknowledge the existence of sub-patterns within a single period. These
patterns are not clear harmonics of the period, so they cannot be eliminated by redefinition
of the period itself. Rather, they lead to apparent short term variations that, together with
noise, can lead to apparent anomalies that are false.
It comes as no surprise to learn that the major sub-pattern is a daily one, once again
driven by the daily 24-hour rhythm of activity, but it is not immediately clear why it is not
the fundamental period of the system. The weekly pattern can be reproduced with very low
levels of noise, because the variations over many weeks of the weekly pattern are small.
The daily pattern has much higher levels of uncertainty, since not all days are equivalent:
weekends typically show very low activity and artificially increase the uncertainty in the
expected signal. The difference between a weekend day and the variation in any day of
the week over several weeks is significant; hence the working week yields the cleanest
periodicity, at least in the data that have been collected in the present investigations [16].
One might perhaps expect that, in a clearly periodic signal, minor sub-patterns in
observations would average out leaving a clear and smooth trend. This would render
the problem of false anomalies insignificant; however, the favoured sensitivity of the
new expectation function to recent events can also lead to artificial uncertainty. Random
fluctuations at closely neighbouring times of day can also lead to apparent variations in the
expectation function that are not statistically significant. We therefore define a procedure
of smoothing or annealing the anomalies by computing a local average as the smoothed
vicinity of the current period. A traditional expectation expression for this would be
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〈χ〉L (τ ) ≡ 1L
τ+L/2∑
=τ−L/2
〈〈χ〉〉T (τ ), (28)
and, in limited memory form, one has
〈〈χ〉〉L (τ ) ≡ 〈〈 〈〈χ〉〉T (τ ) 〉〉L , (29)
and
δ〈〈L〉〉χ(τ) ≡ 〈〈χ〉〉T − 〈〈χ〉〉L , (30)
with corresponding measures for the standard deviations. Using these averages and
deviation criteria, we have a two-dimensional criterion for normalcy, which serves as a
control at two different timescales. One thus defines normal behaviour as
{δ〈〈L〉〉χ(τ), δPχ(n)} < {2σ〈〈L〉〉(τ ), 2σ〈〈P〉〉(n)}. (31)
These may be simply expressed in geometrical, dimensionless form:
(τ, n) =
√(
δ〈〈L〉〉χ(τ)
σ〈〈L〉〉(τ )
)2
+
(
δ〈〈P〉〉χ(n)
σ〈〈P〉〉(n)
)2
, (32)
and we may classify the deviations accordingly into concentric, elliptical regions:
(τ, n) <


√
2
2
√
2
3
√
2
, (33)
for all τ, n, which indicate the severity of the deviation, in this parametrization. This is the
form used by cfengine’s environment engine [14]. Put simply, cfengine smudges gradients
to make them smoother, as well as periodicities; hence, the smoothing algorithm is fully
two dimensional.
Fig. 5 shows detailed, high resolution averages for process count data on a given host,
over an interval of two months. At this level of detail one sees a jagged curve with error bars
which vary considerably in magnitude. Fig. 6 shows an image created using the iterative
algorithm, on the same data, at the same resolution. The main trends of the curve are
still visible. Error bars have been suppressed to avoid clutter (see Fig. 7 for distribution
characteristics).
11. Co-stimulation: Judging the calibrated sensitivity
The greatest problem for anomaly detection is in dealing with periods of low activity,
i.e. a lack of recent past experience. In a period of low activity, every event is “abnormal”.
Cold spots pull the averages down and oversensitize the detection of random events. In such
a case, only a policy decision can renormalize the threshold level to avoid the detection of
certain events.
Our anomaly measurement scale is the standard deviation, but a single standard
deviation is often not even resolvable for a lightly used host, i.e. it is less than the discrete
counting scale of the events; the appearance of a single new event might trigger a standard
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Fig. 5. A high resolution plot of process count behaviour, using the time series sliding window from Ref. [16].
This may be taken as a reference point. The data size is 21114875 bytes.
Fig. 6. A high resolution plot using the iterative algorithm using the same process count data as in Fig. 5. The
data size is 1531904 bytes (13.8 times smaller).
deviation from the norm. For more heavily loaded hosts, with persistent loading, more
reliable measures of normality can be obtained.
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Fig. 7. The scaled scatter distributions, relative to the periodic trend, for HTTP traffic to and from a host. The solid
line shows arriving connections, and the broken line shows outgoing connections. The peaks represent normal or
expected values. The scatter of two values about the normal is quite different, and far from Gaussian in one case,
and thus our idea of anomaly must also be different. The shapes of some of these curves can be calculated using
the periodic model; see Ref. [10] for details.
Fig. 8. A strategy of co-stimulation is used to sequentially filter information. First, long term (low grade) memory
decides whether an event seems statistically significant and assesses the likelihood of danger. If it is significant,
short term (high grade) memory is used to recognize the source of the anomaly.
How can one avoid a deluge of ‘false positives’ in anomaly detection? We must invoke
policy to further classify events as interesting or uninteresting, using the information
content of the events. As part of the policy, we can combine the symbolic and numerical
classifications of events in a kind of ‘co-stimulation’. In other words, one can use qualifiers
(see Fig. 8) to decide when to respond to the classified anomaly.
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The scheme presented in this work has been implemented and tested as part of the
cfengine project [14]. cfengine is a distributed system administration agent, based loosely
on the idea of a computer immune system. Anomaly detection is used to identify unusual
behaviour that can diagnose problems of configuration and perhaps security. cfengine
already has a declarative language that is based on the classification of observations. It
serves as a useful test-bed for anomaly policies.
cfengine adds descriptive predicates for every true classification of its observations. For
example, to generate a simple alert, one could write:
alerts:
entropy_smtp_in_low & anomaly_hosts.smtp_in_high_dev2::
"LOW ENTROPY smtp anomaly on $(host)/$(env_time)"
ShowState(incoming.smtp)
This would generate an alert if incoming e-mail (SMTP connections) exceeded two
standard deviations above normal, at any given time of day, and if the traffic was
predominantly from a single source (low entropy). Such an event could be a candidate
for being a ‘spam’ or junk-mail attack, for instance. The choice of how many standard
deviations above expectation is a matter for policy, but it can be guided by the learned
shapes of the data, such as those in Fig. 7.
With this policy, a few anomalies per day is reasonable to expect from a moderately
loaded host. At this level, anomaly warnings can maintain the attention of a human
operator. Less significant anomalies can be handled in silence, by attaching programmed
responses to the conditions that arise.
12. Some related work
The model used in this work to evaluate anomalies is unlike that of any previous systems
known to the author. Nevertheless, it is fitting to place it in the context of other work. The
literature on anomaly detection is vast and spans a variety of approaches and architectures,
too numerous to chronicle. Only a few milestones are therefore mentioned below.
It is conventional, in the professional literature, to distinguish anomaly detectors from
rule-based pattern matchers [46,48]. An anomaly detector uses the idea of unsupervised
learning [22,23], whereas an intrusion detection system is based on a supervised expert
database of already identified patterns [41,6].
Most anomaly detectors attempt to learn temporal sequences, i.e. patterns or shapes that
can be seen in a multivariate data stream. Early work on this for resource anomalies was
carried out in [30], using time series analysis and spline identification. Since then, more
attention has been given to architectures for data collection, rather than for data analysis—
even now, e.g. [28]. This seems to reflect a philosophy that more data will lead to a greater
chance of finding anomalies, which is the apogee of the approach considered here. Today,
packet analysis using the Snort [48] software is popular owing to its ready availability.
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An important landmark in intrusion detection history was the SRI International
(formerly Stanford Research Institute) Emerald project [32,45]. The aim of Emerald was
to devise a layered approach to real-time anomaly detection in service traffic that was
distributed and reintegrated centrally. Emerald was more of a collection system than an
approach to anomaly decipherment. As such, the approach used is not necessarily at odds
with that presented here, but it does not make apparent use of any compression based on
observations of the data’s structure. Its handling of statistics is somewhat unclear in the
literature, but it was noted that it does not attempt to reduce false positives [40].
A more interesting technique has been used by Forrest et al., applying a probabilistic
detection method, which is also inspired by immunology. The approach is fundamentally
different to the work here: the authors employ stochastic searching of symbolic information
streams, most notably digital streams of system codes. Notable references are [54,20,19],
which inspired an application of this paper’s methods as a supplementary enhancement
in Ref. [3]. No comparison of this method with the present one is possible in the present
context. See Ref. [3] for more details.
Statistical approaches have been employed in various Refs. [50,47,26], but these are not
similar as periodic trend compression seems to have been used.
The work that comes closest to the present approach is the Bayesian learning algorithm
in Ref. [35]. This author stops short of finding a way of using significant trends in the
data to eliminate noise. In Bayesian learning, a system updates its belief about what to
expect [22,56].
The signal analysis approach in Ref. [2] takes an approach that is distantly related to the
strategy, used in this paper, of using periodic functions to approximate the reconstituted
time series. It applies wavelet analysis to an unstructured time series; this approach has
become popular in the analysis of self-similar time series. However, the analysis is an
offline technique and did not yield clear advantages over cheaper methods.
The need for a policy for resolving subjective ambiguities in computer systems has
been explored in a variety of access-security related contexts [53,17], but this is not a
concept that has been discussed for pattern recognition. For intrusion and anomaly systems,
policy usually amounts to defining lists of regular expressions to match symbolic traffic
payloads. Although not all symbolic languages are regular, any finite symbolic language is
regular [37], and all sequences are finite in practice. The computational simplicity of using
regular expressions makes this approach the overwhelming approach of choice.
Policy is normally only applied to Intrusion Detection Systems and firewalls, rather
than anomaly detection systems; see for example Ref. [1]. Approaches that attempt to
characterize and utilize the shape of statistical distributions, other than implicitly with a
Gaussian model, are unknown to the present author.
13. Conclusions
The lazy host-based method of anomaly detection, used by cfengine, employs a two-
dimensional time slice approach and a policy identification language. The resources
required to store learned data are several orders of magnitude less than with traditional
sliding window methods, due to an iterative learning scheme based on geometric series.
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It weights events on a sliding scale of importance so that recent events are geometrically
more important than old events.
The periodic counting parametrization avoids problems associated with long tailed
time-correlation divergences. It is unnecessary to assume Gaussian or Poisson statistics
in their value and time distributions. The result is a probabilistic method, for detecting
anomalous behaviour, that uses a policy-specified deviation from statistical expectation as
a first sign of danger, and only then allows symbolic content to confirm or revoke the sign
(co-stimulation).
The final aim of anomaly research is to have a turn-key, plug and play solution to
the problem of detection, into which users insert their policy requirements and where the
machine does the rest. This requires a language for expressing anomalies in intuitive but
quantitative terms. The model that is developed here allows policy to be expressed in terms
of two statistical quantifiers:
• Number of arrival deviations above or below average, at any moment.
• The sharpness or bluntness of internal information within an observation.
Put in more information theoretical terms, this is nothing more than:
• The statistical uncertainty of the environment.
• The symbolic uncertainty of the event.
With just these two parameters, the cfengine project has shown that one can elegantly
classify and filter anomalies without supervision, and with only a pre-specification of
policy. Thus, we are able to say when an event is anomalous with surprising economy
of expression and resources.
What it is still missing, in the technology of system regulation, is the determination
of meaning in an anomaly, in the sense of how to mount a response to it. This suggests
finding an efficient characterization of the non-statistical, symbolic attributes of events,
summarized in a response policy that attaches countermeasures to the anomalies. This is a
separate and challenging problem which must be the subject of future work.
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